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Abstract: In a recent edition of the Journal of Media Law, Professor Gavin Phillipson 
considered whether the United Kingdom must impose a prior notification obligation on the 
media in respect of stories that concern the private conduct of individuals. Such a notification 
requirement would allow time for the subjects of such stories to seek interim relief to prevent 
publication. Max Mosley has asked the European Court of Human Rights to oblige the UK to 
introduce such a rule. Professor Phillipson concluded that Mosley should win his case. This 
paper proceeds, first, by questioning the fundamental premise of the Phillipson / Mosley 
argument: that damages are inadequate to compensate harms done through publication of 
private information. Secondly, it considers the practical ramifications of the imposition of a 
prior notification requirement, both in terms of the ‘workability’ of a legal obligation and the 
impact it would have on media freedom. Thirdly, it airs the question of whether – in light of 
the margin of appreciation afforded to contracting states – it would be legitimate for the 
Strasbourg court to compel the introduction of a specific measure to assist the protection of 
privacy. The paper concludes that the European Court should not find the United Kingdom in 
breach of its obligations. Nevertheless, it closes with reflections on the desirability of prior 
notification, and the availability of other means to encourage the practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In a recent edition of the Journal of Media Law,1 Professor Gavin Phillipson 
addressed the question of whether ‘in order to ensure effective protection of 
Article 8 rights, UK law needs in some way to provide that newspaper editors, 
before publishing [stories concerning the private details or conduct of individuals], 
should contact their subject’.2 That is, whether the media should be subject to a 
prior notification requirement in such cases. The argument he offered is closely 
related to, but developed further than, that presented by Max Mosley to the 
European Court of Human Rights following his experiences at the hands of the 
News of the World and in the subsequent legal consideration of his claims.3 
Professor Phillipson concluded that there is a ‘very broad consensus that an 
interim injunction will usually be the only satisfactory legal means of protecting 
privacy’.4 In light of this, he asserted that the UK must provide a means whereby 
the protection provided by injunctions is available to claimants as a matter of 
practical reality.5 In undertaking this task, he set out both to justify his own 
position and to engage with a range of counter-arguments that he expected might 
be raised against his views. It is a tightly-argued and persuasive article. 
That said, Professor Phillipson’s key premise and therefore his conclusions 
are not unimpeachable. Moreover, while he recognises and in some measure 
engages with contrary views, he does not always fully value their potency and 
hence does not nullify their practical significance. The aim of this article, then, is 
to reconsider the validity of the arguments presented in Professor Phillipson’s 
paper, and to reprise the counter-arguments in the hope of salvaging their 
importance. Ultimately, it is intended to justify the contrary conclusion to that 
expounded by Professor Phillipson. The imposition of a positive, legal 
requirement on media organisations to notify in advance the subjects of 
journalists’ stories where these might impinge upon putative Article 8 rights is not 
required in order that the United Kingdom satisfy its Convention obligations. This 
is not to argue that such a system may not be desirable. Rather, it is contended 
that it cannot be mandated by the Strasbourg court by reference to Article 8, and 
that if it was to be introduced this would be at the discretion of the relevant 
national authorities. Before introducing any such regime, however, Parliament 
and/or the courts would have to pay more heed to arguments based upon Article 
10. Otherwise, the risk would be that any prior notification requirement could see 
                                                     
1 G. Phillipson, ‘Max Mosley Goes to Strasbourg: Article 8, Claimant Notification and Interim 
Injunctions’ (2009) 1 Journal of Media Law 73. 
2 ibid, 73. 
3 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 687 (QB) (application for interim injunction); [2008] 
EWHC 2341 (QB) (application for strike out of claim for exemplary damages), and [2008] EWHC 1777 
(QB) (final judgment). While the Strasbourg case has been expedited, at the time of writing no judgment 
has yet been handed down. Indeed, it is not yet clear whether there will be an oral hearing. 
4 Phillipson, n 1 above, 96. 
5 ibid. 
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the media become beholden to the courts, and position judges in the editorial seat 
in a manner ill-suited to a modern democratic polity. 
This paper proceeds, first, by questioning the fundamental premise that there 
is a consensus to the effect that damages are inadequate to compensate harms 
done through publication of private information. Secondly, the practical 
ramifications of the imposition of a prior notification requirement, both in terms 
of the ‘workability’ of such a system and the impact of such a regime on media 
freedom, are considered. Thirdly, the question of whether – in light of the earlier 
points – it would be legitimate for the Strasbourg court to compel the introduction 
of a specific measure to assist the protection of privacy is aired. As noted above, 
the paper concludes that the European Court should not find the United 
Kingdom in breach of its obligations. Nevertheless, it closes with some brief 
reflections on the desirability of a prior notification requirement. This focuses 
attention on the constructive suggestions offered by Professor Phillipson – and 
more recently by the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, Media 
and Sport – as to how such might be introduced. 
 
 
 
CONTESTING THE PREMISE:  
IS AN INTERIM INJUNCTION THE ONLY EFFECTIVE REMEDY? 
 
The fundamental premise of Professor Phillipson’s paper is that interim relief is 
critical in privacy cases; that only such a remedy can secure the effective protection 
of Article 8 rights. Damages are considered inadequate to compensate the harm 
done. It is asserted with evidence that there exists an ‘overwhelming’, ‘more or less 
universal agreement’ on this point among academics and jurists, both in the 
United Kingdom and in other jurisdictions.6 Following from the fundamental 
premise, Professor Phillipson contends that editors must make access to interim 
relief possible for the claimant by way of prior notification of a pending story. 
Moreover, he argues that to leave the decision as to whether to notify solely in the 
hands of an editor entails that the remedy for breach of privacy rights cannot be 
understood as being ‘prescribed by law’. This is thought especially the case, 
because editors are commercially incentivised, perhaps insensitised, and some at 
least are contemptuous of both the valuation of privacy in the Convention and of 
the judges who deploy it in their decisions. Hence, the state must somehow 
compel prior notification to take place. 
On one level the fundamental premise proffered by Professor Phillipson is, 
and the various professors and judges cited are, obviously correct. No claimant – 
aside, perhaps, from the most venal7 – would prefer to seek a remedy for the 
publication of private information ex post if a preventative option were available. It 
                                                     
6 Phillipson. n 1 above, 75, 81. 
7 One has in mind here the apocryphal story of the Member of Parliament who positively invited libellous 
comment as the only sure-fire way to a free lunch. 
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is certainly true that ‘the outcome of court cases cannot restore privacy in the way 
that it can restore reputation’.8 Everyone can agree that it is best that injury to 
others is not caused, and that British media organisations – especially the tabloid 
press – do sometimes wreak tremendous harm to individuals. 
Preaching against the sin of injuring others, however, is not the same as 
demonstrating that a legal remedy in damages provided by the State through the 
courts cannot be adequate or effective in compensating for privacy harms. On this 
specific issue, the viewpoints of members of the judiciary here and abroad are 
more equivocal than Professor Phillipson allows. For example, in the recent case 
of Terry (originally LNS) v Persons Unknown, Mr Justice Tugendhat considered that 
‘damages may be an adequate remedy in some cases, if not in all’.9 In the case of 
Hosking v Runting in the New Zealand Court of Appeal, Gault P noted that ‘in 
most cases, damages will be considered an adequate remedy’;10 Tipping J agreed: ‘I 
see the remedy for invasion of privacy as being primarily an award of damages.’11 
Asked to impose a prior notice obligation in an order imposing reporting 
restrictions in the context of child care proceedings, Mr Justice Munby considered 
that this would be ‘fundamentally objectionable’, ‘wrong in principle’, and ‘a 
wholly unacceptable attempt at censorship.’12 Considering the matter from the 
other angle, Lord Scarman famously once declared that ‘the prior restraint of 
publication, though occasionally necessary in serious cases, is a drastic interference 
with freedom of speech and should only be ordered where there is a substantial 
risk of grave injustice’.13 
Three further arguments are posited in the paragraphs that follow to contest 
the premise upon which Professor Phillipson relies. First, it is contended that the 
consensus he perceives must be lacking given that Parliament has proven itself 
perfectly comfortable with the idea that damages are – at least in all but the 
exceptional case – fit to remedy harm to privacy caused by publication. Secondly, 
and perhaps more controversially, it is suggested that the substantive contention 
that interim awards are necessary in this context is not solidly founded. Finally, an 
analogous situation arising from the context of the award of interim injunctions in 
privacy cases – this time facing media defendants and the limitation of their rights 
                                                     
8 Phillipson, n 1 above, 75. Original emphasis. 
9 [2010] EWHC 119 (QB), para 127. In doing so, he echoed Lord Denning MR in Woodward v Hutchins 
[1977] 1 WLR 760. In both cases, the views expressed owed at least something to the perception that the 
cases in misuse of private information and confidentiality respectively while tenable had been brought so 
as to avoid the greater stringency of the test for the award of an interim injunction in libel. 
10 [2004] NZCA 34, para 158. 
11 ibid, para 258. 
12 Kent CC v B (A Child) [2004] EWHC 411 (Fam), para 145. 
13 Attorney-General v British Broadcasting Corporation [1981] AC 303, 362. This sentiment was subsequently 
echoed in the leading Strasbourg case on prior restraint, Observer and Guardian v UK (1992) 14 EHRR 153, 
para 60: ‘the dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny on 
the part of the court’. See, generally, E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd 
ed, 2005) ch 4. 
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to freedom of expression – is sketched, and the absence in that context of any 
legal obligation to give notice is noted. 
 
ABSENCE OF CONSENSUS ON INADEQUACY OF DAMAGES AS A PRIVACY REMEDY 
 
The contention that there is a near-consensus on the proposition that damages are 
an ineffective remedy is somewhat belied by decisions taken by Parliament and the 
courts over the last ten or fifteen years with regard to the availability of interim 
injunctions. The threshold test for the award of an interim injunction in civil 
actions has been redesigned by Parliament in the Human Rights Act 1998 and 
subsequently interpreted by the courts. The mechanism introduced would seem to 
imply a degree of comfort with the idea that publication of private information 
will occur from time to time to be compensated by way of damages only. This 
point can be made more strongly by reference to the approach adopted by 
Parliament to journalistic publication of sensitive personal data in the Data 
Protection Act 1998. This explicitly negates even the possibility that an injunction 
might be awarded to defend privacy interests in exactly the same circumstances as 
might found an action for misuse of private information.  
 
Revision of the test for award of interim injunctions 
In section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 Parliament attempted to buttress 
press freedom against the assertion of other incipiently justiciable Convention 
rights. In its various subsections the provision introduced a general procedural 
expectation that applications for interim relief will be held inter partes,14 a new 
threshold test for the award of interim orders,15 and a number of particular factors 
that courts were henceforth required to take into account when considering the 
award of relief in cases involving journalistic material.16 It has been contended that 
the provision has had little impact on the development of law in this area, and that 
in consequence it ‘serves no sensible purpose’.17 The generality of this critique may 
well be fair, but it would seem difficult to contest that – for most cases – the 
provision has altered the focus of the test as to when an interim injunction should 
be allowed by the court. 
The pre-existing common law rule – which still applies in cases where 
freedom of expression is not relevant – comprises two stages. The first, gateway 
                                                     
14 s 12(2). This rule is subject to two exceptions: first, if the court is satisfied that the applicant has taken 
all practicable steps to notify the respondent, and secondly, where the court is satisfied that there are 
compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified. 
15 s 12(3). 
16 s 12(4).  
17 Lester, Pannick, and Herberg, Human Rights Law and Practice (London: LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2009) para 
2.12, n1. Certainly, the impact of this measure has been less than some in the media might have wished as 
courts have interpreted the provision as imposing no ‘presumptive priority’ for Article 10 over other 
rights – see Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1142, para 27 (per Lord Phillips MR); Re S (a 
child) (identification: restriction on publication) [2003] EWCA Civ 963, para 52 (per Lady Justice Hale), and 
[2004] UKHL 47, para 17 (per Lord Steyn). 
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requirement is that there should be ‘a serious question to be tried’.18 Beyond this, 
the court focuses on the ‘balance of convenience’ between the parties. The essence 
of this approach is the determination of the side on which more would be lost, 
and the assessment of whether damages granted at the substantive hearing would 
amount to adequate compensation for an aggrieved party. It is an explicit 
balancing of the nature of the loss likely to be suffered by the claimant on one 
hand, against the infringement of the publisher’s right to freedom of expression 
and the wider social value to be gleaned from its exercise on the other. Where the 
respective parties have equally much to lose, a ‘counsel of prudence’ encourages 
the taking of measures ‘calculated to preserve the status quo’.19 That is, any 
equivalence of position is decided in favour of the applicant. 
Section 12(3) provides the revised statutory rule for the award of interim 
injunctions in cases where freedom of expression may be affected. It stipulates 
that ‘no such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless 
the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should 
not be allowed’. As interpreted by Lord Nicholls in Cream Holdings, in the normal 
case ‘likely to establish’ is understood as meaning ‘more likely than not’.20 The 
likelihood of winning at trial is installed as the test for the grant of a pre-
publication injunction. The burden of proof in the application for interim relief 
lies squarely on the claimant. In Lord Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd, 
Sir Anthony Clarke MR explained that it is ‘for the claimant to persuade the judge, 
in respect of each category of information, that his prospects of success at the trial 
are sufficiently favourable to justify […] an order being made in the particular 
circumstances of the case’.21 Any uncertainty on the part of the judge is to be 
resolved in favour of publication. This was a deliberate change from the pre-
existing common law rule: ‘the exercise which the court is required to perform is 
[…] altogether different.’22 
Thus, the deliberate choice taken by Parliament in this context was to forego 
the balance of convenience test that saw explicit attention paid to the nature of the 
harm that would be suffered by the claimant. The legislators accepted that in some 
cases where publication could in future be proven to have caused privacy harm, it 
would nonetheless be more important to avoid any restriction on freedom of 
speech. This circumstance would arise whenever a judge could not be persuaded 
that the putative privacy right was likely to be vindicated at trial. During the 
passage of the Bill through Parliament, Jack Straw MP as Home Secretary 
explained that under the new test: 
 
                                                     
18 American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] AC 396, 407 (per Lord Diplock). 
19 ibid, 408 (per Lord Diplock). 
20 Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2004] UKHL 44, para 22. 
21 [2007] EWCA Civ 295, para 43. 
22 Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2003] EWCA Civ 103, para 103 (per Lady Justice Arden). 
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the courts should consider the merits of an application when it is made and 
should not grant an interim injunction simply to preserve the status quo ante 
between the parties […] [section 12(3)] is a much higher test than that there 
should simply be a prima facie case to get the matter into court.23 
 
Hence, by including section 12(3) in the Act, Parliament declared itself content 
with the notion that claimants should instead make good any losses suffered in 
consequence of this choice by seeking damages.  
Of course, the Cream Holdings test does envisage departure from the balance 
of probabilities standard in exceptional circumstances. While the court should be 
‘exceedingly slow’ to move from the normal test, it should accept a lower degree 
of likelihood where the potential adverse consequences of publication may be 
particularly grave.24 Lord Nicholls explained that otherwise the court would be 
unable to make an order ‘in some circumstances where it is plain injunctive relief 
should be granted as a temporary measure’.25 He expected that any other approach 
would make for some ‘extraordinary’ outcomes.26 It is far from clear, however, 
that anticipated privacy harms alone can be sufficient to invoke this exceptional 
approach. Lord Nicholls proffered a short list of exceptional circumstances: where 
publication might expose a claimant to risk of serious personal injury (perhaps 
through criminal retribution or vigilantism), or where a short-lived ‘emergency 
injunction’ is required to enable the court to hear and give proper consideration to 
an application for interim relief. In other cases involving misuse of private 
information, counsel have argued on at least two occasions that privacy harms 
should also fall within the exceptional category.27 In no case has this argument 
been successful.28 
 
Absence of interim order-making power in the data protection act 
The Data Protection Act 1998 covers the obtaining, processing, and disclosure of 
personal data relating to data subjects by data controllers. In the immediate 
context, it covers the acquisition of private information, its storage, consideration, 
preparation, and publication by media organisations. When the legislation was first 
introduced, it was thought to promise ‘a significant new weapon for individuals to 
                                                     
23 315 HCDeb 536-537 2 July 1998. 
24 Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee, n 20 above, para 22. 
25 ibid, para 16. 
26 ibid, para 19. 
27 See John v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 1611 (QB), paras 6-7; A v B, C, D [2005] EWHC 
1651 (QB), para 13. While it is not clear from the court report, it seems likely that an argument of this 
type might was also made, and if so then unsuccessfully, in the case of Mahmood v Galloway [2006] EWHC 
1286 (QB). 
28 In the – possibly – analogous scenario of the award of final injunctions contra mundum, the courts have 
once countenanced harm to privacy alone as warranting especial treatment, but only in the most extreme 
of circumstances – see X (a woman formerly known as Mary Bell) and Y v O’Brien and others [2003] EWHC 
1101 (QB). They have also refused to make such awards in circumstances where only ‘mere’ harm to 
privacy was in question – see Re W (A Child) [2010] EWHC 16 (Fam). 
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curb the intrusive excesses of the media’.29 It was used regularly in support of 
privacy actions based primarily upon breach of confidence.30 Interest in deploying 
the Act in cases concerning publication, however, may have diminished.31 If this is 
the case, one explanation is certainly that Parliament determined that it should not 
be possible to obtain an interim injunction under the Act.32 
Importantly, in section 32 the 1998 Act includes an exemption that applies in 
the context of data processing only for the ‘special purposes’ (those of journalism, 
art, and literature). The exemption breaks down into two parts: the substantive 
exemption which absolves data controllers from the duty to adhere to most data 
protection principles if certain criteria are satisfied, and a procedural exemption. 
The procedural exemption is found in subsections 4 and 5. Section 32(4) provides 
that where proceedings are brought against a media organisation in respect of 
personal data that is being processed with a view to publication, and which 
twenty-four hours before the proceedings in question had not been published by 
the data controller, the proceedings must be stayed by the court.33 The specific 
aim of this provision is to ensure that interim injunctions cannot be obtained 
under the Act in order to prevent media publication. In designing the section 32 
procedural bar to pre-publication action, Parliament specifically determined that 
only damages should be available to remedy harms caused. Manifestly, the 
legislature does not subscribe to the consensus identified by Professor Phillipson. 
 
 
 
                                                     
29 M. Jelf, ‘Not With a Bang But a Whimper? A Right to Privacy and the End of Voluntary Self 
Regulation of the Press’ (1999) 10(8) Entertainment Law Review 244, 244. 
30 A. Hudson, ‘Privacy: A Right by Any Other Name’ (2003) Supp (Special issue: privacy) European Human 
Rights Law Review 73, 79. The seminal case in which the obligations falling upon media companies under 
the Act were first interpreted was Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2002] EWHC 499 (QB). Passing 
reference to the Act was earlier made by Lord Justice Brooke in Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2000] EWCA Civ 
353, para 56. 
31 H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media Freedom Under the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006) 721; A. McLean and C. Mackey, ‘Is There a Law of Privacy in the UK? A Consideration of 
Recent Legal Developments’ (2007) 29(9) European Intellectual Property Review 389, 394. It is certainly 
possible to identify actions in which the Act might have been deployed but in fact was not – see, for 
example, Green Corns Ltd v CLA Verley Group Ltd. [2005] EWHC 958 (QB) (as noted explicitly by Mr 
Justice Tugendhat at para 62). 
32 Other explanations include the fact that the Act was accorded only cursory treatment by the House of 
Lords in Campbell ([2004] UKHL 22, paras 32 and 130), and the damages awarded under the head of 
misuse of private information were not then duplicated under the statute. Moreover, in Douglas v Hello! 
Ltd. [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch), para 239, the claimants recovered only nominal damages on the basis of the 
Act (beyond the remedy awarded in respect of the main claim). 
33 The case can then proceed only in two circumstances: first, if the Information Commissioner 
determines under section 45 that the exemption does not apply in the circumstances of the case (a 
process that will involve a substantial delay) (s 32(5)(a)), or secondly, when – in a case where the 
proceedings were stayed on the making of a claim by the data controller that the processing related to the 
special purposes – the claim is withdrawn (s 32(5)(b)).  In Campbell, the Court of Appeal tentatively added 
a third scenario, indicating that the statute left this possibility to be inferred: ‘presumably, if publication 
takes place before the Commissioner has ruled on the claim, the stay ceases to be effective’ ([2002] 
EWCA Civ 1373, para 116). 
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THE ADEQUACY OF DAMAGES AS A PRIVACY REMEDY 
 
The main purpose of the previous section was not to argue that it is right or best 
always to rely on damages to remedy privacy harms caused by publication. Indeed, 
it is conceivable that had the claim for misuse of private information not 
developed since the introduction of the Human Rights Act, the Data Protection 
Act scheme would have been open to challenge as being not Convention-
compliant. Rather, the purpose was to highlight that the question of how best to 
protect the Article 8 interest is one on which there remains room for debate; that 
there is no consensus on the inadequacy of damages. In the paragraphs that 
follow, the substantive view that damages are inadequate to remedy privacy harms 
caused by publication is addressed more squarely.  
The primary justification for the contention that interim relief is the only 
effective remedy in privacy cases is that ‘once lost’, privacy and confidentiality are 
‘gone forever’. This is contrasted with defamation where the perceived harm – 
reputational damage – can purportedly be restored through legal vindication. This 
immediate argument may be sustainable, but it risks eliding the deeper principle. 
The truth is that it is not unusual for non-monetary harms to be compensated by 
damages, and the comparison with the unusual tort of defamation does not 
provide an argument that demonstrates the inadequacy of the damages remedy in 
all privacy cases. 
In many circumstances, the law is asked to provide compensation by way of 
general damages for non-monetary losses suffered by claimants. Consider the 
hypothetical situation where a child throws a stone towards – and hits – another in 
the hope of demonstrating his ‘bravery’ to a watching audience. The harm to the 
injured party is caused as a by-product of the perpetrator’s primary purpose. No 
one would argue that monetary compensation for the loss of an eye can restore 
sight to the victim of such personal injury. Nevertheless, assuming they were 
awarded at a sufficiently high level, damages would be generally understood to be 
fair and just satisfaction, and hence an effective remedy. The claimant would of 
course prefer that the injury had never taken place. It is not clear why privacy 
harms should be treated differently to this or other forms of irreversible non-
pecuniary loss. 
A secondary justification for the inadequacy of damages as a remedy is that – 
having failed to obtain an interim award or having never had the opportunity to 
seek one – claimants are in practice unable to proceed to obtain compensation at 
trial. That is, that the damages remedy is in practice illusory. Professor Phillipson 
founds an argument of this type on the supposition that having suffered the 
ignominy of the first exposure of their private details and/or conduct, claimants 
will be loath to proceed to trial with the concomitant secondary exposure that this 
may entail. He cites Max Mosley and Sir Christopher Meyer – the former Chair of 
the Press Complaints Commission – in support.34 The argument was encapsulated 
                                                     
34 Phillipson, n 1 above, 76. 
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in the words of Mr Justice Eady in Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd: ‘once 
privacy has been infringed, the damage is done and the embarrassment is only 
augmented by pursuing a court action.’35 It is certainly true that any interim 
hearing on privacy cases that occurs is often the determinative stage of the legal 
process. Moreover, it must intuitively be true that some proportion of cases can be 
explained by the desire of claimants to avoid further embarrassment. It is not at all 
clear, however, quite how sizeable this proportion is; nor is it obvious that this 
should be a relevant factor to which the Strasbourg court should attend. 
If the argument is to rest upon the idea that it will be an unusual claimant 
who proceeds to trial in the face of further onslaughts on his or her privacy – that 
‘claimants with the degree of resolve of Mr Max Mosley are likely to be few and 
far between’36 – then it faces two problems. First, such claims do reach the final 
trial stage from time to time; media organisations do often agree to settle privacy 
claims in advance of trial where presumably they are persuaded that the claimant 
will otherwise proceed to trial,37 and alternative regulatory options that potentially 
promise their own measure of follow-on media attention are quite heavily used in 
the privacy context.38 These factors suggest that many claimants are not at all 
cowed by the prospect of further embarrassment. Given that the private matters 
have already been published, a competing assumption to that cited by Professor 
Phillipson is that some claimants may feel that they stand to lose little more by 
seeking compensation. Indeed, it would not be surprising if they were – 
sometimes unwisely – motivated by anger to proceed. 
Secondly, there are other reasons why claimants may decide not to proceed 
that are distinct from the fear of pouring oil on fire. In cases where an interim 
injunction has been refused, this will generally have been because the judge in the 
interlocutory hearing was not persuaded that the claimant was more likely than not 
to be successful at trial. The claimant will have received a strong steer from the 
judge as to whether there is sufficient weight to his or her contention. It might be 
expected that some will heed this advice. Perhaps more important is the cost 
                                                     
35 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), para 230. 
36 ibid. 
37 Figures on the number of libel and privacy cases resolved in 2008 involving nine national newspaper 
groups, broadcasters, and news agencies as well as local newspaper publishers were included as an 
appendix to the preliminary report published by Lord Justice Jackson in May 2009. This demonstrated 
that there were 15 pure privacy claims resolved in that year (two other resolved privacy complaints also 
included libel elements), including one at trial (Mosley). The average agreed damages across 14 of these 
cases was £29.3k. In the 15th case, the amount of damages was not clearly stated, although it was 
probably in the £5-10k range. The highest agreed damages were £60k (the same level as the court-
awarded amount in Mosley), while no damages were paid in four cases. It is presumed, of course, that 2008 
was a representative year. See Jackson, Civil Litigation Costs Review: Preliminary Report. (London: Stationery 
Office, 2009) app 17. 
38 For example, in the year from April 2008-March 2009 (PCC reports 77 and 78), there were ten 
adjudicated complaints and 55 resolved complaints based upon Clause 3 of the PCC Editor’s Code (the 
generic clause focused on privacy) considered by the Press Complaints Commission. Other regulatory 
alternatives to legal action include complaint under the Ofcom Broadcast Code and the BBC Editorial 
Guidelines. 
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factor, especially when weighed against prospective benefits. Applications for 
interim relief are typically short in the preparation, and hence are not especially 
costly. The same cannot be said of proceeding towards a full trial.39 Especially 
where the legal risk is high, many claimants will decide that they are unwilling to 
bear this financial detriment. This is especially the case in privacy cases where the 
level of damages awarded in decided cases has tended to be lower than awards in 
libel actions so that even a successful claimant is likely to face a costs shortfall 
after damages. This problem may be mitigated where the claim is covered by a 
conditional fee agreement.40 
Notably, the argument presented by Professor Phillipson did not cite 
prohibitive costs as a reason why access to effective justice was not thought to be 
available to privacy claimants. This is not surprising: the idea that the cost of 
privacy actions tends to the prohibitive would not be an argument for the disposal 
of claims at an interim stage when evidence will usually have been pleaded by way 
of written affidavit only and not cross-examined. It could be an argument for the 
introduction of some expedited regime for the determining of cases of this type, 
but that is a separate question to that of whether prior notification should be 
obligatory. 
Even allowing that fear of further embarrassment dissuades some claimants 
from proceeding to a final trial, this does not mean that for the general case the 
United Kingdom does not offer an effective remedy. It does not mean that 
claimants should necessarily have the opportunity to obtain an interim injunction, 
and hence cannot dictate that prior notification should be obligatory. An interim 
injunction is not – in law – a final remedy. Indeed, it is questionable whether it 
should be understood as a ‘remedy’ at all, given that it does not follow from a full 
determination of the legal rights and interests at stake in given proceedings. It is an 
order sometimes made to maintain the status quo in advance of the determination 
by the court of the substantive legal position.41 That the award of an interim 
injunction will often serve, de facto, as a final remedy is due to the practical reality 
that such orders are regularly left unchallenged by the defendant or other affected 
parties. 
In this context, it is a curious argument that says that because a claimant 
chooses not to avail of the opportunity to vindicate his or her Article 8 rights (that 
                                                     
39 Total costs in the Mosley case were measured at over £836k split broadly equally between claimant and 
defendant. This sits against the – uniquely high – damages award of £60k in that case. The average 
claimant costs for the 14 settled cases was £10,360, while average defendants costs were £5,220. The 
latter figure is likely to be understated as seven of the reported cases cited zero defendant costs. This 
implies that this subset of the stated figures do not include the cost of in-house legal advice. Accounting 
for this supposed oversight, defendants costs roughly equate to those for claimants – see, generally, 
Jackson, n 37 above, app 17. 
40 Interestingly, none of the 15 cases cited in the appendix to the Jackson report (ibid) were covered by a 
CFA. 
41 This fact was reiterated by Lord Hoffmann in Attorney-General v Punch [2002] UKHL 50 (para 74): He 
noted that conclusions on interlocutory injunctions are reached ‘ordinarily to preserve the existing 
position pending a decision on the merits […] it does not involve any decision as to whether any 
particular act falling within the prohibition would, or even arguably would, infringe the plaintiff's rights’. 
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is, to seek compensation for the putative breach of the right to respect for 
privacy), the State has somehow failed adequately to protect them. It is akin to 
arguing, in circumstances where a media defendant elects not to challenge an 
interim order on grounds of cost, that the State has failed to secure that 
organisation’s Article 10 rights. It is difficult to identify the difference of principle 
between diffidence based upon fear of further embarrassment and that based 
upon a dearth of means. In both cases, a putative right has been curtailed. The fact 
is that while the notion that only an interim injunction will suffice to protect 
privacy interests is intuitively attractive, on deeper examination – outside extreme 
and definite versions of the argument – the proposition is not especially 
persuasive. 
 
ABSENCE OF DUTY TO PRE-NOTIFY THIRD PARTIES AFFECTED BY INTERIM ORDERS 
 
The comparison adopted above is not a facile one. Rather, it evokes an analogous 
problem to that faced by the disgruntled claimant who was not informed of 
pending publication that can also be drawn from the context of the award of 
interim injunctions. Interestingly, the courts have recently come to recognise this 
analogous problem. It involves a situation in which a legal notification 
requirement might allow a media defendant to avoid the imposition of an 
inappropriate or at least an over-broad, limitation of their freedom of expression. 
The responses offered may prove instructive with regard to the proposition 
regarding the need for prior notification of claimants. 
As noted above, section 12(2) of the Human Rights Act introduced a general 
procedural expectation that applications for interim relief will be held inter partes 
when any award might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of 
expression.42 When an injunction is sought against the media organisation that is 
threatening to publish, this ensures that the defendant is normally able to make 
legal representations to the judge in advance of any order being made even though 
this may be at very short notice. 
Section 12(2) does not extend this benefit to any third parties to the action. 
By virtue of the ‘Spycatcher principle’, third parties will include any person – 
including other media organisations – who is served notice of the order made.43 
                                                     
42 Exceptions arise where the court is satisfied that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify 
the respondent (s 12(2)(a)), or that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be 
notified (s 12(2)(b)). It can be argued that the statutory provision added nothing to the pre-existing 
common law rules – see Lester, Pannick, and Herberg, n 17 above, para 2.12.2, n 4. 
43 In normal circumstances, orders made by the court – whether at the interim or final stages – bind only 
those persons to whom they are addressed. The ‘Spycatcher principle’, however, effectively extends this 
reach to any person on whom notice of an interim order is served. As explained by Mr Justice Gray in 
Jockey Club v Buffham [2002] EWHC 1866 (QB), para 26, ‘the claimant in a confidence action enjoys […] a 
windfall consisting in protection pending trial against invasion of his right of confidentiality by third 
parties. But the reason for the existence of that windfall is the need for the Court to be able to enforce, 
through the machinery of the law of contempt, the object for which the interlocutory injunction was 
granted and not to protect the confidential informatio
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Importantly, if the named defendant is some person other than a media 
organisation, this may mean that no legal argument will be presented to the judge 
that canvasses matters pertinent to publication before an order is made. Moreover, 
if an application is made against ‘persons unknown’ there may be no defendant 
present at all to counter the arguments proffered by the claimant.44 Finally, if the 
claimant can persuade the judge to include terms imposing confidentiality as to the 
existence of the order – that is, if the judge awards a ‘super-injunction’ – no third 
party media organisation will ever learn of the issue concerned unless notice is 
served by the claimant. Moreover, the third parties who are notified will be told 
nothing by the applicant about the grounds for the claim, or any possible defence 
to it. In order to learn more, the third party would have to bear the cost of 
challenging the order before a court. Precisely this concatenation of issues 
confronted Mr Justice Tugendhat in John Terry (originally LNS) v Persons Unknown.45 
There may well be circumstances in which all of the above processes and 
features prove appropriate to the award of a given interim order. The point is that 
the media organisations caught by the injunction will find themselves in that 
predicament without first having had the opportunity to present legal argument to 
the court. Yet, their rights to freedom of expression will have been curtailed. 
While they will have the opportunity to challenge the existence or the breadth of 
terms of the order after it constrains their actions, such a challenge may often not 
be forthcoming. This may well be on grounds of cost, rather than acquiescence to 
the legal ruling. 
This problem has been recognised by the courts. In the case of X and Y v 
Persons Unknown, Mr Justice Eady agreed with counsel that it is important to 
acknowledge the interests of third parties to the case who are likely in practice to 
be effectively constrained – albeit by the law of criminal contempt – should an 
interim order be made.46 Reflecting on the limited scope of the protective 
obligation in section 12 of the Human Rights Act, he noted that ‘in principle, an 
extension of the requirements of notification to third parties would be 
unobjectionable and entirely consistent with Parliament’s intention’.47 While such 
third parties would be entitled to mount a challenge to the terms of the order in so 
                                                                                                                                       
the order itself. Rather, the rules of contempt of court operate to ensure that the third party cannot 
publish information covered by the injunction. 
44 An important foundation for this practice was the decision of Sir Andrew Morritt VC in Bloomsbury 
Publishing Group Ltd & Anor v News Group Newspapers Ltd & Ors [2003] EWHC 1205 (Ch). The Vice 
Chancellor undertook an analysis of both the English law and comparative jurisprudence. He noted that 
the ‘over-riding objective’ of the Civil Procedure Rules – as expressed in Rule 1.1 – was to enable the 
court to deal with cases justly. This justified his subsequent conclusion that ‘John Doe’ orders were 
permissible, ‘the crucial point […] [being] that the description used must be sufficiently certain as to 
identify both those who are included and those who are not’ (para 21). 
45 [2010] EWHC 119 (QB). 
46 [2006] EWHC 2783 (QB), paras 9-20. 
47 ibid, para 11. He accepted that there may be ‘theoretical difficulties in defining or identifying how far 
the category of interested third parties extends […] sometimes […] it will be clear that the class of 
persons whose rights will be affected will be different from, and extend more widely than, those persons 
whom the applicant intends to serve’ (para 12). 
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far as it affected them, ‘prevention would be even better than cure’.48 The upshot 
was that as a matter of ‘best practice’ for the future: 
 
where a litigant intends to serve a prohibitory injunction upon one or more 
[media publishers], in reliance on the Spycatcher principle, those individual 
publishers should be given a realistic opportunity to be heard on the 
appropriateness or otherwise of granting the injunction, and upon the scope 
of its terms.49 
  
This suggestion is not backed by any legal obligation. Although conceivable, it is 
most unlikely that any failure to notify third parties to whom the claimant intends 
to give notice may be punished in the exercise of the judge’s discretion as to 
whether to make an order.50 The parallel to the situation decried by Max Mosley is 
obvious, and the nature of the putative solution noteworthy. 
 
 
 
PRACTICAL CONCERNS WITH A PRIOR NOTIFICATION 
REQUIREMENT 
 
Aside from the question of whether the right to respect for privacy may be 
breached by state reliance upon a remedy in damages only, there may be 
significant practical obstacles to the operation of a prior notification regime. The 
generality of this point, along with some particular issues, was recognised by 
Professor Phillipson.51 These obstacles are such, however, as to cast doubt on the 
feasibility of the proposal, at least to the extent that it involves the imposition of a 
legal obligation. Some of these difficulties would be specific to the particular 
notification obligation requested by Max Mosley.52 Others would necessarily arise 
because it would be difficult sensibly to limit the obligation to the claim for misuse 
of private information. In the former regard, for example, it is not clear on whom 
the obligation should fall (the mainstream media, the expert blogger, the citizen 
journalist, the chatroom participant, neighbours gossiping over the privet), or on 
what categories of information the obligation would bite.53 In the latter respect, as 
                                                     
48 ibid. 
49 ibid, para 18. This idea was elaborated further in paragraph 19 of the judgment by analogy with section 
12 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
50 It would be more likely to see a judge introduce a return date in the order sought. Subsequent cases 
suggest that this best practice is sometimes honoured in the breach – see, for example, the background to 
the John Terry case, n 45 above.  
51 Phillipson, n 1 above, 94-96. 
52 The difficulties that could arise in the context of the actual operation of the proposed legal duty to 
notify subjects of journalists’ stories are canvassed at length in the submission of the Media Lawyers 
Association to the European court regarding the Mosley application. 
53 As Professor Phillipson noted (n 1 above, 94), depending on the manner in which the concept of 
private information develops over time in domestic law, say to cover any photograph taken in a public 
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a matter of principle, if the requested prior notification obligation were 
introduced, it is not easy to see how its extension to other forms of irreversible, 
non-pecuniary harm could be resisted (confidentiality, some forms of harassment, 
personal injury, national security, perhaps libel). 
The more poignant practical concerns, however, relate to the impact of any 
general prior notification requirement in privacy cases upon media freedom. That 
is, the imposition of such an obligation could impinge upon the Article 10 rights 
of the media organisation involved in any given case, and upon the legal framing 
of the societal role of the media in general. The extent of this change is uncertain 
and might easily be overstated, but a notification requirement would be intended 
specifically to increase the number of instances in which prospective claimants 
would be able to apply for the award of interim relief. As noted above, in practice 
injunctions are sometimes awarded at very short notice by non-specialist judges 
even without the presentation of legal argument by affected media parties. Such 
injunctions may be unnecessarily broad in their terms, or perhaps even illegitimate 
in their entirety.  
In every additional case in which notice was given under the new obligation, 
the particular defendant and/or any other media organisation on whom notice of 
the order is served would have to decide whether to contest or subsequently to 
challenge the order. Even should they be successful, this would impose an 
additional cost and a measure of delay into the newsgathering and editorial 
processes. As Mr Justice Tugendhat has recognised, such costs may easily be 
disincentive enough to see an investigation spiked.54 Often, delay is anathema to 
news journalism. In Greene v Associated Newspapers Limited, Lord Justice Brooke 
reflected that ‘scoops, as [counsel] observed, are the lifeblood of the newspaper 
industry […] he might have added that stale news is no news at all’.55 The same 
idea is familiar in Strasbourg jurisprudence: ‘news is a perishable commodity and 
to delay its publication, even for a short period, may well deprive it of all its value 
and interest.’56 It has also previously been noted by Professor Phillipson: ‘from the 
defendant’s perspective […] if the story is topical, even an interim injunction 
might kill it off completely.’57 Moreover, the delays involved – even where the 
media organisation is ultimately successful in having an injunction lifted – can be 
significant.58 This scenario would amount to the procedural licensing by the 
                                                                                                                                       
place when the subject was not engaged in performance of an official role, the obligation could become 
extensive indeed. See, generally, K. Hughes, ‘Photographs in Public Places and Privacy’ (2009) 1 Journal of 
Media Law 159. 
54 John Terry (originally LNS) v Persons Unknown [2010] EWHC 119 (QB), para 20. 
55 [2004] EWCA Civ 1462, para 75. 
56 Observer and Guardian v UK (1992) 14 EHRR 153, para 60. 
57 G. Phillipson and H. Fenwick, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act 
Era’ (2000) Modern Law Review 660, 691. 
58 As noted in the submission of the Media Lawyers Association, in Cream Holdings there was a delay of 
more than two years between the initial award of the injunction and its lifting by the House of Lords (n 
20 above); in Napier v Pressdram Limited [2009] EWCA Civ 443, a temporary restraint pending appeal – 
imposed on the refusal to make an award proper for the duration of the appeal process – was in place for 
five months. In evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, the 
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judiciary of the content of media publications. Publishers would have to pay for 
the right to publish; editorial decisions would be judicially sanctioned. The law 
reports are replete with warnings as to the inappropriateness of such a 
predicament.59 
An unqualified obligation might easily create further problems. They may 
preclude certain forms of investigatory journalism in which contact could warn 
subjects of impending exposure and potentially see them abscond or otherwise 
preempt a desirable outcome. They can allow the subjects time to identify and to 
pressure whistleblowers into reneging on information provided.60 Perhaps more 
insidiously, a prior notification obligation could promote a bargaining relationship 
between journalist and subject. It would naturally tend further to encourage 
‘collaboration’ as the opportunity to negotiate over the permissible content of 
editorial output becomes more prevalent. It is dangerous to overlook the existence 
of the public relations industry the primary purpose of which is to promote 
positive images and to deflect deleterious stories.61 None of this, while admittedly 
only an exacerbation of the current predicament of the ‘fourth estate’, is an 
edifying prospect. 
On these points, and perhaps surprisingly given the readiness with which he 
accepts the purported practical impact of the non-availability for claimants of an 
interim order, Professor Phillipson seemed relatively sanguine about the potential 
chilling effect of a prior notification obligation on journalism. He suggested that 
delays imposed need not be extended, and as such are not overly significant. 
Moreover, he argued that assertions of perishability ‘[amount] only to a rather 
large generalisation about factual phenomena – that delay will often deprive a story 
of its value […] [and that] as such it should generally be treated with caution and 
not assumed to apply in every case’.62 Quite, but it would apply in some cases, and 
a blanket obligation to notify or even a requirement to notify when serious harm 
to privacy was likely would still cause some instances of the perceived problem. 
Professor Phillipson did not mention the costs associated with overturning or 
                                                                                                                                       
editor of Private Eye explained, ‘We are involved in a case at the moment where we attempted to run a 
story in January and we still [in May] have not been able to run it. The journalist involved put it to the 
person involved, which was an error; there was an immediate injunction; we won the case; they have 
appealed; we are still in the Appeal Court [...] so you find yourself unable to run stories because they have 
invoked confidentiality or bound it up with privacy and that is a real problem [...] I am sitting on a very 
good story [...] not about sex, nothing to do with red tops, a proper public interest story […] and it would 
have been in the public domain if I had not tried to act responsibly [...] essentially it is censorship by 
judicial process because it takes so long and it costs so much’ – see Select Committee on Culture, Media 
and Sport, Second Report: Press Standards, Privacy and Libel – Oral and Written Evidence,  HC362-II (London: 
Stationery Office Ltd, 2009-2010) ev190, Q866. 
59 See, for example, Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127, 200 (per Lord Nicholls); Campbell v 
Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, para 59 (per Lord Hoffmann) and para 112 (per Lord 
Hope); Re Guardian News & Media Ltd [2010] UKSC 1, para 63 (per Lord Rodger). 
60 Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, n 58 above, ev190, Q866, per Ian Hislop. 
61 See, generally, N. Jones, ‘Max Clifford and Celebrity Journalism: The ‘Holier Than Thou’ Sage on 
Media Ethics’ at http://www.nicholasjones.org.uk (accessed April 2010). 
62 Phillipson, n 1 above, 90. 
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contesting such injunctions as are imposed erroneously or with over-broad effect. 
He did appreciate that errors would be made at the interim stage, but suggested 
that the appropriate means of addressing this risk was to improve judicial 
reasoning at that point.63 This is sensible, but impractical in the context of fast-
paced decisions based on under-cooked evidence. It also ignores the opportunities 
for ‘game-playing’ on the part of claimants. 
In some respects, the counterpoints offered here can be understood as 
expressing sympathy for the devil. The difficulty, of course, is distinguishing the 
fair organisations, journalists, and stories from foul, when the problem cannot be 
presumed to rest long in a given location. The appropriate conclusion is that a 
prior notification obligation would place an illegitimate constraint upon Article 10 
in some individual cases, and that it could restrict media freedom in general. This 
impact should not be overlooked. 
 
 
 
ILLEGITIMACY OF STRASBOURG INTERVENTION: 
THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 
 
In considering the issue of whether the Strasbourg court is free to dictate how 
states should design the regimes by which they protect Convention rights, as 
would be necessary if it were to insist that a prior notification obligation must be 
introduced, Professor Phillipson faced a problem. The court has long recognised 
that as regards the satisfaction of positive obligations to secure ‘respect’ for 
privacy rights, what is required is seldom ‘clear-cut’ and ‘will vary considerably 
from case to case’ in light of the diversity of circumstances and practices followed 
in different states.64 Therefore, the court has accepted that signatories ‘enjoy a 
wide margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken’.65 This 
understanding has been affirmed regularly by the European court, and is reflected 
in recent decisions.66 It will apply, as in this context, where the state concerned 
must determine how best to balance competing Convention rights. Having 
recognised this difficulty, Professor Phillipson’s strategy was to attack its basis. His 
first tactic was to contend that there is in fact, however implicitly, a consensus 
regarding the need for a prior notification requirement. His second was to argue 
that the concept of a margin of appreciation is in any event no longer applicable in 
this context; to contend that ‘such an argument […] is now out of date’.67 
                                                     
63 ibid, 93-94. 
64 Johnston v Ireland (1987) 9 EHRR 203, para 55. 
65 ibid. 
66 In Evans v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 34, para 77, for example, the court noted that ‘where […] 
there is no consensus within the Member States […] as to the relative importance of the interest at stake 
or as to the best means of protecting it […] the margin will be wider […] there will also usually be a wide 
margin if the State is required to strike a balance between competing […] Convention rights’. 
67 Phillipson, n 1 above, 79. 
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The first tactic has not performed its task. In developing his fundamental 
premise regarding the inadequacy of damages as a privacy remedy, Professor 
Phillipson undertook a brief comparative glance at the position in some other 
jurisdictions. He did not profess this to be a comprehensive or detailed analysis, 
but did use it to support his thesis that there is consensus on the necessity of interim 
relief (and implicitly therefore on the need for prior notification to make this 
good). As argued above, what he in fact demonstrated was at best a near-
consensus on the utility of such intervention. Notably, Professor Phillipson’s 
analysis did not identify the existence of prior notification obligations in any other 
jurisdictions. 
A wider review of other jurisdictions would have illustrated that on this 
specific issue there is a rather more variegated picture. In its submission to the 
European Court of Human Rights, Guardian News and Media Ltd presented the 
results of a survey of more than twenty European and international jurisdictions. 
It highlighted that a prior notification requirement was imposed as a legal duty in a 
small number of states that were formerly part of or dominated by the Soviet 
Union, but not in any common law jurisdiction or in other any civil law regime. 
The intervention concludes that far from there being a near consensus favouring 
prior notification, there exists ‘an international consensus among the great 
majority of Contracting States against the imposition of [such] a duty’. In its 
submission, the Media Lawyers Association highlighted European Union 
legislation and Council of Europe resolutions that affect the media, and pointed 
out that none of this corpus included a prior notification obligation. 
To develop his second tactic, Professor Phillipson cited two recent 
Strasbourg decisions: Armoniene v Lithuania,68 and I v Finland.69 He used the first 
case to contend that the international court ‘is now prepared to stipulate as to the 
remedy required to protect Article 8 rights against the media’.70 On the basis of 
the second decision, Professor Phillipson argues that ‘the absence of effective 
prospective means of ensuring the security of personal information against 
unauthorised disclosure may itself amount to a breach of Article 8, despite the 
availability of ex post facto compensatory damages’.71 
The problem with these arguments is that neither case does quite what 
Professor Phillipson requires. While Armoniene is an authority for the argument 
that the court may intervene with regard to remedies for the protection of Article 
8 rights, on the facts it is concerned with a remedy in damages that was capped at 
such a low level as to be incapable of compensating for the harm caused in the 
circumstances of the case. It is focused on quantum, and does not dictate that the 
category of remedy selected was inappropriate. I v Finland does stand as authority 
                                                     
68 (2009) 48 EHRR 53. 
69 (2009) 48 EHRR 31. 
70 Phillipson, n 1 above, 79 (original emphasis). 
71 ibid, 80 (original emphasis). 
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for the proposition that Professor Phillipson notes, but importantly, this decision 
is specific to its facts. It would not be applicable in the context of a prior 
notification obligation imposed on the media; the right to freedom of expression 
was not involved in that case, and so it did not concern a balancing of Convention 
rights. Rather, the case centred on the specific failure of a public body properly to 
protect privacy rights by securing personal data in accordance with procedures 
already required under domestic data protection law, and the consequent failure of 
the state to vindicate the right. 
In light of these arguments, it would be a brave international court that 
intervened in national policy choices to stipulate precisely how mechanisms 
introduced to balance Convention rights must be designed on the basis of these 
authorities. The importance of the margin of appreciation concept in this context 
is that it determines whether it can be legitimate for the court to direct the 
introduction of the proposed legal obligation. The view that the margin of 
appreciation should remain wide in this area does not dictate the conclusion that a 
prior notification requirement (or ‘best practice’) in privacy cases is undesirable. 
Rather, it is to assert that any decision to introduce such an expectation must be 
left to relevant national authorities. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This response to Professor Phillipson’s paper set out above is intended to serve 
three purposes. First, to contest the premise that damages cannot be an effective 
remedy for privacy harm, that interim relief is critical, and that in consequence the 
United Kingdom is obliged under the European Convention to introduce some 
form of legal prior notification requirement. Secondly, to assert that the 
introduction of such an obligation would face significant practical hurdles, and 
that it would cause interference with the expression rights of media organisations 
and others in the individual and general case. Finally, in light of the views taken on 
these prior themes, to argue that it would not be appropriate for the Strasbourg 
court to compel the introduction of such a mechanism. None of this was to 
gainsay the fact that, as Professor Phillipson persuasively portrayed, the media 
does sometimes extinguish the privacy rights of individuals in a wholly 
unacceptable manner, and that for this reason a prior notification expectation is 
perhaps desirable. Ultimately, Professor Phillipson’s paper is a call for 
improvements in the system as it stands. The choice over whether and how to 
introduce such a rule, however, is for national authorities.  
If such a reform is deemed necessary or desirable, the immediate question is 
how this should be done. On this question, Professor Phillipson offered some 
insightful suggestions including the possibility of allowing the imposition of 
aggravated or exemplary damages and/or indemnity costs to punish and deter 
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non-adherence to the notification obligation.72 Since the publication of his paper, 
the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport has 
published the report of its longstanding inquiry into press standards.73 This also 
dealt at some length specifically with Mr Mosley’s complaint, and made specific 
proposals for reform.74 The Committee rejected the call for the imposition of a 
legal obligation, but recommended a damages penalty for breach of a new rule of 
journalistic ethics to be included in relevant privacy codes. This rule would require 
prior notification, subject to a public interest override. By virtue of section 12(4) 
of the Human Rights Act, adherence to the appropriate regulatory rule by the 
media organisation would then become a justiciable factor in any determination by 
a judge of the nature of any remedy to be awarded in a privacy case. 
One attraction of a combination of the Phillipson and Select Committee 
proposals is that it would navigate the problem of determining to whom, and in 
respect of what, the prior notification expectation is to apply. Those covered 
would be those who commit themselves to the self-regulatory regime overseen by 
the Press Complaints Commission or those who are bound by their licences to 
adhere to the Ofcom Broadcast Code as appropriate. Such persons would be 
covered to the extent that they engage in publication behaviours. Clearly, there is a 
need to consider the operation of the regime under which interim relief is – or is 
not – currently made available to those who fear the illegitimate exposure of 
private information, and the closely-related questions that arise in the context of 
defamation. The concatenation of problems faced by media defendants, as noted 
above, also calls for consideration. In this context, it is important and to be 
welcomed that the Master of the Rolls has recently announced the opening of an 
inquiry into precisely these topics. The outcomes of that inquiry are anticipated 
with interest. 
                                                     
72 Phillipson, n 1 above, 96. 
73 Second Report: Press Standards, Privacy and Libel HC362 (London: the Stationery Office Ltd, 2009-2010). 
74 ibid, paras 40-57, 77-93. 
